Given a public-key infrastructure (PKI) and digital signatures, it is possible to construct broadcast protocols tolerating any number of corrupted parties. Existing protocols, however, do not distinguish between corrupted parties who do not follow the protocol, and honest parties whose secret (signing) keys have been compromised but continue to behave honestly. We explore conditions under which it is possible to construct broadcast protocols that still provide the usual guarantees (i.e., validity/agreement) to the latter.
Introduction
Broadcast protocols allow a designated party (the dealer ) to distribute an input value to a set of parties such that (1) if the dealer is honest, all honest parties output the dealer's value (validity), and (2) even if the dealer is dishonest, the outputs of all honest parties agree (agreement). Broadcast protocols are fundamental for distributed computing and secure computation: they are crucial for simulating a broadcast channel over a point-to-point network, and thus form a critical sub-component of various higher-level protocols.
Classical results of Pease, Shostak, and Lamport [11, 9] show that broadcast is achievable in a synchronous network of n parties if and only if the number of corrupted parties t satisfies t < n/3. To go beyond this bound, some form of setup is required. The most commonly studied setup assumption is the existence of a public-key infrastructure (PKI) such that each party P i has a public signing key pk i known to all other parties. (Of course, this is only interesting if we assume the existence of secure digital signatures [6] ). In this model, broadcast is possible for t < n [11, 9, 2] .
With few exceptions [4, 7] (see below), prior work in the PKI model treats each party as either totally honest, or as completely corrupted and under the control of a single adversary; the assumption is that the adversary cannot forge signatures of any honest parties. In many situations it makes sense to consider a middle ground: parties who honestly follow the protocol but whose signatures might be forged (e.g., because their signing keys have been compromised). Most existing work treats any such party P i as corrupt, and provides no guarantees for P i in this case: the output of P i may disagree with the output of other honest parties, and validity is not guaranteed if P i is the dealer. Clearly, it would be preferable to ensure agreement and validity for honest parties who have simply had the misfortune of having their signatures forged.
Here, we consider broadcast protocols providing exactly these guarantees. Specifically, say t a parties in the network are actively corrupted; as usual, such parties may behave arbitrarily and we assume their actions are coordinated by a single adversary A. We also allow for t c parties who follow the protocol honestly, but whose signatures can be forged by A; this is modeled by simply giving A their secret keys. We refer to such honest-behaving parties as compromised, and require agreement and validity to hold even for compromised parties.
Say t a , t c , n satisfy the threshold condition if 2t a + min(t a , t c ) < n. We show:
1. For any t a , t c , n satisfying the threshold condition, there is an efficient protocol achieving the notion of broadcast outlined above.
2. When the threshold condition is not satisfied, broadcast protocols meeting our notion of security are impossible (with the exception of the "classical" case where t c = 0, in which case standard results imply feasibility).
3. Except for a few "exceptional" values of n, there is no fixed n-party protocol that tolerates all t a , t c satisfying the threshold condition with respect to n. For the exceptional values of n, we show protocols that do tolerate any t a , t c satisfying the threshold condition.
Taken together, our results provide a complete characterization of the problem for threshold adversaries. (Subsequent to our work, Hirt and Zikas [8] extended our results to the case of more-general access structures.)
Motivating the problem. Compromised parties are most naturally viewed as honest parties whose secret keys have been obtained by the adversary, e.g., because a user's secret key was weak, or because an adversary hacked into a user's system and obtained their secret key (but subsequently the honest party's computer was re-booted and now behaves correctly). Exactly this scenario is addressed by proactive cryptosystems [10] in a somewhat different context. Our work also provides guarantees in case an honest user's signature might be forged (whether or not the adversary learns the user's secret key). Signature forgery can potentially occur due to cryptanalysis, poor implementation of cryptographic protocols, or side-channel attacks. In all these cases, an adversary might be able to forge signatures of a small number of honest parties without being able to forge signatures of everyone.
Prior work. Gupta et al. [7] also consider the problem of designing broadcast protocols providing agreement and validity for honest-behaving parties whose secret keys have been compromised, and claim results similar to ours. Our results improve upon theirs in several respects. For starters, their positive result appears to be flawed 1 ; in any case, the protocol they present has complexity exponential in n, whereas the protocol we show in this paper has complexity polynomial in n. Although Gupta et al. also claim impossibility when 2t a + min(t a , t c ) ≥ n, our impossibility result is simpler and stronger in that it holds relative to a weaker adversary. 2 Finally, Gupta et al. treat t a , t c as known and do not consider the question of designing a fixed protocol achieving broadcast for any t a , t c satisfying the threshold condition (as we do in the third result mentioned above).
Fitzi et al. [4] consider broadcast in a model where the adversary can either corrupt a few players and forge signatures of all parties, or corrupt more players but forge no signatures; a statement of their result is given here as Theorem 11. Our work addresses the intermediate cases, where an adversary might be able to forge signature of some honest parties but not others.
Organization. Section 2 introduces our model and formal definition of broadcast in our setting. In Section 3 we show that for every t a , t c , n satisfying the threshold condition there exists an efficient protocol for broadcast. We show our impossibility results in Section 4: namely, that broadcast is impossible whenever t a , t c , n do not satisfy the threshold condition (except when t c = 0), andother than for certain exceptional values of n -there does not exist a fixed protocol achieving broadcast for all t a , t c satisfying the threshold condition. In Section 5 we give positive results for the exceptional values of n. Although dealing with these "outliers" may seem like a minor point, the exceptional values of n are all small and so may arise in practice.
Model and Definitions
We consider the standard setting in which n players communicate in synchronous rounds via authenticated channels in a fully connected, point-to-point network. (See below for further discussion regarding the assumption of authenticated channels.) We assume a public-key infrastructure (PKI), established as follows: each honest party P i runs some key-generation algorithm Gen (specified by the protocol) to obtain a public key pk i along with a corresponding secret key sk i . Then all parties begin running the protocol holding the same vector of public keys (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ), and with each P i holding sk i .
A party that is actively corrupted (or "Byzantine") may behave arbitrarily. All other parties are called honest, though we further divide the set of honest parties into those who have been compromised and those who have not been compromised, as discussed below. We view the set of actively corrupted players as being under the control of a single adversary A coordinating their actions. We always assume such parties are rushing, and may wait to see the messages sent by honest parties in a given round before deciding on their own messages to send in that round. Actively corrupted parties may choose their public keys arbitrarily and even based on the public keys of honest parties. We continue to assume, however, that all honest parties hold the same vector of public keys.
Some honest parties may be compromised ; if P i is compromised then the adversary A is given P i 's secret key sk i . We stress that compromised parties follow the protocol as instructed: the only difference is that A is able to forge signatures on their behalf. On the other hand, we assume A is unable to forge signatures of any honest players who have not been compromised.
We assume authenticated point-to-point channels between all honest parties, even those who have been compromised. In other words, although the adversary can forge the signature of an honest party P i who has been compromised, it cannot falsely inject a point-to-point message on P i 's behalf. This assumption is reasonable since different cryptographic keys (other than parties' signing keys) could be used for authenticating point-to-point communication; in small-scale networks, authenticated communication could even be established via physical means. Without the assumption of authenticated channels, no meaningful results are possible.
Definition 1 A protocol for parties P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, where a dealer D ∈ P holds an initial input m ∈ M, achieves broadcast if the following hold:
Validity If the dealer is honest, then all honest parties output m.
Agreement All honest parties output the same value.
We stress that "honest" includes honest parties who have been compromised.
Although the above refers to an arbitrary input m ∈ M for the dealer, we assume for simplicity that the dealer's input is a bit b. Broadcast for arbitrary-length messages can be obtained from binary broadcast using standard techniques.
An adversary A is called a (t a , t c )-adversary if A actively corrupts up to t a parties and additionally compromises up to t c of the honest parties. In a network of n players, we call A a threshold adversary if A chooses t a , t c subject to the restriction 2t a + min(t a , t c ) < n, actively corrupts up to t a parties, and compromises up to t c honest parties.
Broadcast for (t a , t c )-Adversaries
In this section, we prove the following result:
Theorem 2 Fix n, t a , t c . If t c = 0 or 2t a + min(t a , t c ) < n, there exists an n-party protocol achieving broadcast in the presence of a (t a , t c )-adversary.
When t c = 0 no signatures can be forged, and so a standard protocol for authenticated broadcast suffices. If t a ≤ t c then 3t a < n and the parties can run a standard (unauthenticated) broadcast protocol where the PKI is not used at all. The challenge is thus to design a protocol for 0 < t c < t a , and we deal with this case in the remainder of the section.
In fact, we show how to achieve weak broadcast for 2t a + t c < n. Weak broadcast is a relaxation of broadcast where validity holds as before, but agreement is weakened to require only that if any honest party outputs a value b ∈ {0, 1} then every other honest party outputs either b or ⊥. Since it is known [5, 4] that weak broadcast implies broadcast unconditionally (i.e., without using a PKI at all) when 2t a < n, this proves our desired result.
Theorem 3 For any n, t a , t c with 2t a + t c < n, the protocol in Figure 1 achieves weak broadcast in the presence of a (t a , t c )-adversary.
Proof: We first prove validity. If D is honest and not compromised, then in round 1 each honest party P i = D receives (b, σ D ) with Vrfy pk D (b, σ D ) = 1. So in round 2 this means that P i receives Let P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } denote the set of parties. Let D ∈ P denote the dealer, b ∈ {0, 1} its input, and pk D , sk D its public and secret keys. A protocol for weak broadcast, for fixed t a , t c with 2t a + t c < n.
valid b-tuples for at least the n − t a − 1 honest parties excluding D. Since D's signature cannot be forged, P i receives no validb-tuples in round 3. We conclude that P i outputs b.
The argument is similar if D is honest but compromised. Again, in round 1 each honest
; in round 2, P i receives valid b-tuples for at least the n − t a − 1 honest parties excluding D. Now, however, since the adversary can forge signatures of D and t c − 1 other honest parties, P i may receive validb-tuples for up to t a + t c − 1 parties in round 3. But t a + t c − 1 < n − t a − 1, so P i still outputs b.
Finally, we prove weak agreement. Say some honest P i outputs a bit b. This means that P i must have received valid b-tuples for at least n − t a − 1 parties in round 2. Since P i forwards these to all other parties, any other honest party P j receives valid b-tuples for at least n − t a − 1 parties in round 3, and so cannot possibly outputb.
Impossibility Results
In this section we show two impossibility results. First, we show that there is no protocol achieving broadcast in the presence of a (t a , t c )-adversary when 2t a + min(t a , t c ) ≥ n and t c > 0, thus proving that Theorem 2 is tight. We then consider the case when t a , t c are not fixed in advance, but instead all that is guaranteed is that 2t a + min(t a , t c ) < n. (I.e., we seek a single protocol that works for all values of t a , t c satisfying this condition.) We show that in this setting broadcast is impossible for all but a few exceptional values of n.
The Three-Party Case
We first present a key lemma that will be useful for the proofs of both the results described above. Our proof of the lemma follows the presentation in [3] which considers a different security model.
Lemma 4
There is no 3-party protocol among a set of parties {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } that achieves broadcast when P 1 acts as the dealer and the adversary A can choose any one of the following corruption patterns:
• Actively corrupt P 1 .
• Actively corrupt P 2 , and compromise the secret key of P 1 .
• Actively corrupt P 3 , and compromise the secret key of P 1 .
Proof: Fix some protocol Π, and let Π 1 , Π 2 , Π 3 denote the program specified by Π for parties P 1 , P 2 , P 3 respectively.
We imagine running Π in the modified network shown in Figure 2 . Here, two independent copies Π 1,0 , Π 1,1 of Π 1 are run in the following way. All messages sent by Π 1,0 to P 3 are discarded, while all messages sent to P 2 are delivered to Π 2 . Any messages expected from P 3 are replaced with null messages. Similarly, all messages sent by Π 1,1 to P 2 are discarded, while all messages sent to P 3 are delivered to Π 3 . Any messages expected from P 2 are replaced with null messages. Messages sent by Π 2 to P 1 are routed to Π 1,0 ; thus, Π 1,1 does not receive any messages directly from Π 2 . Similarly, all messages sent by Π 3 to P 1 are now routed to Π 1,1 , and so Π 1,0 does not receive any messages directly from Π 3 . Programs Π 2 and Π 3 interact with each other just as they would in a real network. We stress that Π 1,0 and Π 1,1 use the same public/secret keys, namely, the keys belonging to P 1 .
Claim 5
There exists an adversary A that actively corrupts P 1 and such that the joint view of P 2 and P 3 interacting with A in the real network is identically distributed to the joint view of Π 2 and Π 3 in the modified network.
Proof: See Figure 3 . A simply simulates the behavior of Π 1,0 and Π 1,1 . That is, A internally runs (independent) programs Π 1,0 and Π 1,1 . The messages A sends to P 2 (resp., P 3 ) are those sent by Π 1,0 to P 2 (resp., Π 1,1 to P 3 ); the messages A receives from P 2 (resp., P 3 ) are delivered to Π 1,0 (resp., Π 1,1 ).
Figure 3: An adversary corrupting P 1 and interacting with P 2 and P 3 in the real network can simulate Π 1,0 and Π 1,1 interacting with Π 2 and Π 3 .
Claim 6
There exists an adversary A that actively corrupts P 2 and compromises P 1 and such that the joint view of P 1 and P 3 interacting with A in the real network is identically distributed to the joint view of Π 1,1 and Π 3 in the modified network.
Proof:
See Figure 4 . A has sk 1 and sk 2 and so can internally run Π 1,0 and Π 2 , forwarding messages between them internally. A always sends null messages to (the real) P 1 , and ignores all messages from P 1 . The messages A sends to P 3 are those sent by Π 2 to Π 3 , and messages from P 3 are delivered to Π 2 .
By an analogous argument, we have:
Claim 7 There exists an adversary A that actively corrupts P 3 and compromises P 1 and such that the joint view of P 1 and P 2 interacting with A in the real network is identically distributed to the joint view of Π 1,0 and Π 2 in the modified network.
We will now focus on an execution in the modified network. Say Π 1,0 has input 0 and Π 1,1 has input 1. Since Π guarantees validity, Claim 6 implies that Π 3 must output 1 and, similarly, Claim 7 implies that Π 2 must output 0. But then Claim 5 shows that Π does not achieve agreement.
Figure 4: An adversary corrupting P 2 , compromising P 1 , and interacting with P 1 and P 3 in the real network can simulate Π 2 and Π 1,0 interacting with Π 1,1 and Π 2 .
4.2 Impossibility of Broadcast when 2t a + min(t a , t c ) ≥ n and t c > 0
In this section, we extend the three-party impossibility result to the general case using a standard player-partitioning argument.
Theorem 8 Fix n ≥ 3 and t a , t c with t c > 0 and 2t a +min(t a , t c ) ≥ n. There is no n-party protocol achieving broadcast in the presence of a (t a , t c )-adversary.
Proof: Partition P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } into three sets P 1 , P 2 , P 3 such that P 1 contains min(t a , t c , n−2) parties (note that P 1 is non-empty), and P 2 , P 3 each contain at least one and at most t a parties. Such a partition is possible given the constraints.
Assume the existence of an n-party protocol Π (for n ≥ 3) achieving broadcast in the presence of a (t a , t c )-adversary. We construct a three-party broadcast protocol Π by having P i (for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) internally simulate an execution of Π by the parties in P i , in the obvious way. (The public key of each party in Π now consists of multiple public keys of parties in Π. But nothing in the definition of the PKI model requires public keys of parties to have any particular form.)
Π is secure against an adversary who actively corrupts P 1 , as this corresponds to actively corrupting at most min(t a , t c , n−2) ≤ t a parties in Π. Protocol Π is also secure against an adversary who actively corrupts P 2 and compromises the secret key of P 1 , as this corresponds to actively corrupting at most t a parties and compromising the secret key of at most min(t a , t c , n − 2) ≤ t c parties in Π. Similarly, Π is secure against an adversary who actively corrupts P 3 and compromises the secret key of P 1 . But this contradicts Lemma 4.
Impossibility of Broadcast with a Threshold Adversary
We now turn to the case of a threshold adversary. Recall that in this setting the exact values of t a and t c used by the adversary are not known; we only know that they satisfy 2t a +min(t a , t c ) < n (and we allow t c = 0). In what follows, we show that broadcast is impossible if n / ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12}. For the "exceptional" values of n, we demonstrate feasibility in Section 5.
, then there is no n-party protocol achieving broadcast in the presence of a threshold adversary. (The given bound on n holds for all n > 1 except n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12}.)
Proof: Once again, we use a player-partitioning argument. Partition P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } into three non-empty sets P 1 , P 2 , P 3 such that P 1 contains at most n−1 2 parties, and P 2 , P 3 contain at most
parties. Such a partition is possible given the bound on n. Assume the existence of an n-party protocol Π achieving broadcast in the presence of a threshold adversary. We construct a three-party broadcast protocol Π by having P i (for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) internally simulate an execution of Π by the parties in P i , in the obvious way.
Π is secure against an adversary who actively corrupts P 1 , as this corresponds to actively corrupting at most t a = n−1 2 parties in Π (and so 2t a + min(t a , t c ) = 2t a < n). Protocol Π is also secure against an adversary who actively corrupts P 2 and compromises the secret key of P 1 , as this corresponds to actively corrupting at most t a = n−1 3 parties and compromising the secret key of at most t c = n−1 2 parties in Π (and so 2t a + min(t a , t c ) = 3t a < n). Similarly, Π is secure against an adversary who actively corrupts P 3 and compromises the secret key of P 1 . But this contradicts Lemma 4.
Handling the Exceptional Values of n
We refer to {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 , 12} as the set of exceptional values for n. (These are the only positive, integer values of n for which Theorem 9 does not apply.) We show for all the exceptional values of n an n-party protocol achieving broadcast in the presence of a threshold adversary. Recall that a threshold adversary can choose to corrupt t a parties, and compromise the secret keys of an additional t c parties, for any t a , t c satisfying 2t a + min(t a , t c ) < n.
The cases n ∈ {2, 3, 4}. These cases are all handled relatively easily. For n = 2 we must have t a = 0 and so broadcast is trivial to achieve. For n = 3 we can just run any protocol for authenticated broadcast; either (t a , t c ) = (1, 0), in which case no honest parties' signatures can be forged and so broadcast is achieved, or else t a = 0, in which case the ability to forge signatures is of no use to the adversary (recall we assume that all point-to-point links are authenticated). For n = 4 we have t a ≤ 1 and t c ≤ n. Since t a < n/3, here we may use any protocol for standard (unauthenticated) broadcast. Summarizing:
Theorem 10 For n ∈ {2, 3, 4} there is an n-party protocol achieving broadcast in the presence of a threshold adversary.
The case n = 5. Here we may rely on the result of Fitzi et al. [4] , which we re-state for convenience using our notation: Theorem 11 ([4] ) Fix any n, t, T with T < n/2 and T + 2t < n. Then there exists an n-party protocol that achieves broadcast in the presence of either a (T, 0)-adversary or a (t, n−t)-adversary.
Setting t = 1 and T = 2, this theorem implies a 5-party protocol that achieves broadcast in the presence of a threshold adversary. (Indeed, for a threshold adversary attacking a 5-party protocol either t a = 2 and t c = 0 or t a ≤ 1 and t c ≤ n.)
Corollary 12 There is a 5-party protocol achieving broadcast in the presence of a threshold adversary.
The case n = 6. For n = 6 we reduce to the case n = 5. Specifically, take the following protocol Π: The dealer signs its input b, sends b and its signature to everyone else, and terminates with output b. Each of the remaining parties then broadcasts what they received from the dealer using the 5-party protocol from Corollary 12. Let a b-signature be a valid signature of the dealer on the bit b. Each party P i (other than the dealer) decides on its output as follows: If there is only one value b for which P i has received a b-signature, then P i outputs b. Otherwise, P i outputs the value b for which the number of broadcast b-signatures is maximized. (Output 0 in case of a tie.)
For a threshold adversary either t a = 2 and t c ≤ 1, or t a ≤ 1 and t c ≤ 6. If the dealer is honest and not compromised, clearly all honest parties will output the dealer's input b. In any other case, the corruption pattern among the five other parties (i.e., excluding the dealer) must satisfy the threshold condition (for those n = 5 parties); thus, broadcast is achieved in the second stage and agreement follows. Validity when the dealer is honest but compromised is implied by the fact that a majority of the five other parties are honest. We conclude:
Theorem 13 There is a 6-party protocol achieving broadcast in the presence of a threshold adversary.
For the case of n = 9, we reduce to the case n = 8. Specifically, take the following 9-party protocol: The dealer signs its input b, sends b and its signature to everyone else, and terminates with output b. Each of the remaining parties then broadcasts what they received from the dealer using the 8-party protocol implied by Corollary 16. (D is not involved in these executions.) Let a b-signature be a valid signature by D on the bit b. Each P i (other than the dealer) decides on its output as follows: If there is only one value b for which P i received a b-signature, then P i outputs b. Otherwise, P i outputs the value b for which the number of broadcast b-signatures is maximized (or 0 in case of a tie).
For a threshold adversary either t a = 4, t c = 0, or t a = 3, t c ≤ 2, or otherwise t a ≤ 2, t c ≤ n. If the dealer is honest and not compromised, clearly all honest parties will output the dealer's input b. In any other case, the corruption pattern among the remaining parties (i.e., excluding the dealer) must satisfy the threshold condition for those 8 parties; thus, broadcast is achieved in the second stage and agreement follows. When the dealer is honest but compromised we have t c ≥ 1 and so t a ≤ 3; validity is then implied by the fact that a majority of the 8 parties other than the dealer are honest.
Theorem 17 There is a 9-party protocol achieving broadcast in the presence of a threshold adversary.
The case n = 12. The final case is handled using a variant of the protocol from If (t a , t c ) = (4, 3) then all honest parties receive valid b-tuples for at least 7 parties in round 2, and receive validb-tuples for at most 6 parties in round 3. If (t a , t c ) = (5, 1) then all honest parties receive valid b-tuples for at least 6 parties in round 2, and receive validb-tuples for no parties in round 3. Thus, validity holds in every case. Assume D is corrupt. To prove weak agreement, say an honest party P i outputs b and consider another honest party P j . If P i outputs b due to condition (1) then P i received valid b-tuples for at least 8 parties in round 2; thus, P j receives at least 8 − 4 = 4 valid b-tuples in round 2 (recall that D is corrupt, so at most 4 of the remaining parties can be corrupt) and so at most 7 validb-tuples in that round. Since P i sends its valid tuples to P j , we see that P j receives at least 8 valid b-tuples in round 3 and so cannot outputb.
If P i outputs b due to condition (2) then we need to show that P j cannot outputb due to conditions (2) or (3). In this case P i received valid b-tuples for 7 parties in round 2, but since it sends these to P j we see that P j cannot outputb. The case where P i outputs b due to condition (3) is analogous.
Once again, using [5, 4] 
this gives:
Corollary 19 There is a 12-party protocol achieving broadcast in the presence of a threshold adversary.
